We empirically test whether SBA-guaranteed lending has a greater impact on economic performance in markets with a high percentage of potential minority small businesses. This hypothesis is predicated on priors related to three overlapping assumptions. These three assumptions are: (1) The classic type of credit rationing developed in the seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is more likely to occur in markets with a higher per capita percentage of minority small businesses because such markets are more likely to have more severe information asymmetry problems, (2) SBA-guaranteed lending is likely to reduce these credit rationing problems-thus improving the level of development of the local financial market, and (3) increased local financial market development helps to lubricate the wheels of economic performance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Using local labor market employment rates as our measure of economic performance, we find evidence consistent with this proposition. In particular, we find a positive and significant impact on the average annual level of employment in a local market of SBA-guaranteed lending in that local market. This impact is 200 percent larger in markets with a high percentage of potential minority small businesses. This result has important implications for public policy in general and SBA-guaranteed lending in particular.
Small firm credit market discrimination, SBA guaranteed lending, and local market economic performance
Introduction
Minority entrepreneurs report that access to adequate capital is a major problem much more often than their majority counterparts. For example, in a recent study, Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) report that Black small business owners are three times as likely as White small business owners to list access to sufficient capital at reasonable rates as a major problem faced by their firm.
This reported disparity in access to capital between minority and majority small business owners may stem from one or two possible sources [or some combination of these sources]. Either minority small business owners do not offer to capital providers as many positive net present value (NPV) projects, on average, as majority small business owners. Or, minority small business owners are subject to certain constrains on the flow of capital to their operations that majority small business owners do not encounter.
The former is simply a perception of capital access disparities. However, the latter represents real economic effects that serve to distort capital markets and reduces the efficiency of our overall financial system. Most of the extant literature points to this latter description as painting the more accurate picture of the current market conditions faced by minority owners of small firms. For example Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2002) report that minority-owned small businesses are not significantly less profitable than majority owned small businesses. Thus, the hypothesis that minority small business owners on average have fewer NPV projects is not supported by the data.
What then are the likely sources of capital access constraints on minority small businesses? The extant literature usually points to discrimination as the likely culprit.
For example, Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) conclude that their analysis (which considers a very rich set of explanatory variables) strongly points to severe levels of discrimination in small business credit markets.
There are at least two reasons why discrimination against minority-owned firms might be observed in small business credit markets. The first is simply prejudicial behavior [Becker (1971) type discrimination]. The second is related to differential levels of asymmetric information and credit rationing. If minority-owned firms are more likely to be credit rationed because of relatively larger asymmetric information problems, then it is possible to observe capital allocation outcomes in the small firm credit market that coincide with outcomes based on prejudicial discriminatory behavior. However, if the source of the disparity is credit rationing, then this type of behavior is more accurately described as statistical discrimination and does not carry the nefarious connotations associated with prejudicial discrimination. Nevertheless, it is still discrimination and more importantly, it places a real cost on our economic system. One method likely to reduce these costs of asymmetric information based discrimination is to reduce the amount of asymmetric information in these credit markets [especially for minority-owned firms]. One very practical method for doing this is to encourage lenders to make [profitable] loans that they would not otherwise make. And, in so doing the lender develops a "relationship" with the borrower. This relationship allows for the collection of borrower-specific information at a relatively low cost through basic monitoring of the loan. This reduces future levels of asymmetric information and reduces observed statistical discrimination by fostering a relationship between the minority-owned small business and the lending entity.
One program designed to ameliorate the asymmetric information problem in small business credit markets is the SBA guaranteed lending program. There is some evidence that this program helps to reduce credit rationing problems in small firm credit markets [Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2006] . Because the financial contracting problems that lead to credit rationing are basically the same types of problems that lead to statistical discrimination, it is reasonable to investigate whether a government intervention that reduces credit rationing also reduces observed disparate treatment or observed discrimination.
Thus, the primary research question addressed in this paper is: Does SBA guaranteed lending lessen the negative impacts of discrimination on minority entrepreneurs and their communities? The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide some background on economic performance and financial market development. In section 3 we present a discussion of public policy and small business credit markets. In section 4 we provide a brief review of the academic literature on credit rationing and relationship lending. This literature is consistent with the hypothesis that information problems in lending markets are particularly severe in the small firm credit market and hence provides a rationale for SBA loan guarantees. An overview of SBA lending programs is presented in section 5. Section 6 outlines the data, our hypotheses and empirical strategy. The results appear in section 7. Finally, our conclusions and future research questions are outlined in section 8.
Background on economic performance and financial market development
It is a well documented finding in the economics literature that economic growth and financial market development tend to be positively correlated. However, whether relatively higher levels of financial development actually cause higher levels of economic performance, or higher levels of economic performance cause higher levels of financial development, is an issue of debate that dates at least to the studies of Schumpeter (1911) and Robinson (1952) .
Three important recent studies provide evidence that relatively higher levels of financial market development do indeed tend to lead to higher levels of one measure of economic performance. That is, higher rates of economic growth. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) , Zingales (1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) , all report significant evidence supporting the proposition that the causal relationship runs from more financial market development to more economic growth. All of these papers are very careful to develop reasonable structural instruments to proxy for the relative amount of local financial market development.
In this paper, we investigate whether local financial market development helps to promote economic performance by focusing on a particular rationale for such a relationship. That rationale is financial market development may increase the amount of external finance available to minority-owned small firms. Specifically, we examine whether a government intervention aimed at increasing small firms' access to bank credit has a relatively greater impact in high-minority areas. We use SBA guaranteed lending as our government invention method. We choose the [minority-owned] small firm credit market because of the high degree of information asymmetry that may be associated with it. And, because this information asymmetry may lead to a credit rationing problem as explained in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . This may be especially important in highminority areas where the per capita number of minority-owned small businesses is likely to be higher.
We choose the SBA guaranteed lending program because our previous research (Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2006) suggests that SBA guaranteed lending has a small positive influence on the rate of economic growth in local geographic markets. Our previous research used MSAs and non-MSA counties to represent local geographic financial markets. However, Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006) did not investigate whether a positive relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and other measures of economic performance existed. Nor did we investigate whether these relationships were different for areas with a relatively high proportion of minorities in the local market. We refer to these markets as high-minority markets. And, we use the level of labor market employment, or the employment rate, as our measure of economic performance. Thus, we test whether SBA guaranteed lending has a differential impact for high-minority markets.
In this paper, our null hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending does not impact high-minority markets differently than low minority markets. And, our primary alternative hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending has a greater impact on the employment rate in high-minority markets. This alternative hypothesis is predicated on priors related to three assumptions. First, less developed financial markets are more likely to experience severe information asymmetry problems, and as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out, that could lead to credit rationing. Second, SBA guaranteed lending is likely to reduce these credit rationing problems. This will improve the level of development of that local financial market. And, third, this increased financial market development will help to lubricate the wheels of economic performance [especially in high-minority markets] and increase the effective level of labor utilization, or the employment rate (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) .
Our results suggest that high-minority markets are positively impacted by SBA guaranteed lending. Moreover, the impact for high-minority markets is three times as large as it is for low minority markets. This result has important implications for public policy in general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular.
Public policy and small business credit markets
The promotion of small businesses is a cornerstone of economic policy for a large number of industrialized countries. Public support for small enterprise appears to be based on the widely held perception that the small business sector is an incubator of economic growth, a place where innovation takes place and new ideas become economically viable business enterprises. In addition, policymakers routinely point to small businesses as important sources of employment growth. It is not surprising, then, that there is widespread political support for government programs, tax breaks, and other subsidies aimed at encouraging the growth and development of small business in the United States, and increasingly, around the world.
A particular area of concern for policymakers is whether small businesses have access to adequate credit. After all, a lot of small firms are relatively young and have little or no credit history. Lenders may also be reluctant to fund small firms with new and innovative products because of the difficulty associated with evaluating the risk of such products. These difficulties are classic information problems-problems obtaining sufficient information about the parties involved in a transaction-and they may prevent otherwise creditworthy firms from obtaining credit. If information problems are substantial, they can lead to credit rationing, that is, loans are allocated by some mechanism other than price. If small businesses face credit rationing, the next Google, Microsoft, or Starbucks might wither on the vine for want of funding. To the extent that credit rationing significantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale exists for supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving small business access to credit. This rationale may be even stronger when applied to highminority markets.
One specific government intervention aimed at improving the private market's allocation of credit to small enterprises is the Small Business Administration ( Thus, SBA guaranteed loans represented over 10% of total commercial bank small business loans outstanding at that time. And, commercial banks provide the majority of small business credit supplied in the USA.
The rationale for SBA guarantees appears to be that credit market imperfections can result in small enterprises being credit rationed-particularly for longer-term loans for purposes such as capital expansion. If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in the markets for small business loans, then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance.
And, this is what we found in Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006) . In particular, we found a positive (although small) and significant relationship between the level of SBA lending in a local market and future per capita income growth in that market. Overall, our empirical results were consistent with a positive impact on social welfare of SBA guaranteed lending.
In this paper we use a simplified version of the analysis in Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006) to evaluate a potential determinant of economic performance in highminority communities. Specifically, we test whether SBA guaranteed lending to small firms has a relatively greater impact on the average level of labor employment in highminority local markets. We find that it does.
In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of the economics of small firm credit markets. This discussion focuses on a highly select group of theoretical and empirical articles that help explain the severe credit allocation problems caused by imperfect information in small firm credit markets. These articles also provide insight into the mechanism that allow a government intervention, such as the SBA guaranteed lending program, to result in higher economic performance in high-minority markets.
The economics of small firm credit markets
The economic justification for any government-sponsored small business lending program or loan guarantee program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of the private sector to allocate loans efficiently. Absent such a clearly identified problem with private sector lending to small businesses, the SBA's activities would simply seem a wasteful, politically motivated subsidy to this sector of the economy.
Many economists, most notably Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981) , contend that private lending institutions may indeed fail to allocate loans efficiently because of fundamental information problems in the market for small business loans.
These information problems may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and constitute the failure of the credit market. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks consider both the interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan when deciding to make a loan. But the lack of perfect information in loan markets may cause two effects that allow the interest rate itself to affect the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio. When the price (here, the interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely that a price will emerge that suits either the available buyers or sellers (that is, no price will "clear the market"). The first effect, adverse selection, impedes the ability of markets to allocate credit using price by increasing the proportion of high risk borrowers in the set of likely borrowers. The second effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of prices to clear lending markets because it influences the ex post actions of borrowers.
The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having different probabilities of repaying their loans. The expected return to the bank on a loan obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. But it is difficult to identify such borrowers. Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so. The interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device. For example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, worse risks. These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower. So, as the interest rate rises, the average "riskiness" of those who are willing to borrow increases, and this may actually result in lowering the bank's expected profits from lending.
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior of the borrower is likely to also change. For instance, raising the interest rate decreases the profitability of projects which succeed. Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to undertake riskier projects -projects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful. In other words, the price a firm pays for credit may affect its investment decisions. This is the moral hazard problem.
As a result of these two effects, a bank's expected return may increase less for an additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain point may actually decrease as the interest rate is increased. Clearly, under these conditions, it is conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in equilibrium. Although traditional analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this case. This is because the bank would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than the average current borrower. The expected return on a loan to this borrower at the higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected return on the loans the bank is currently making. Hence, there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that when borrowers are distinguishable, the lender may decide to deny credit to an entire group. This is their classic redlining argument. We expect the likelihood of this type of credit rationing to be higher in highminority communities. Furthermore, because the value of collecting information on borrowers may be less in high-minority markets [because of expectations of less aggregate per capita lending], the levels of imperfect information may be higher, in equilibrium, in high-minority markets. Kane and Malkiel (1965) come to a similar conclusion about the possibility of banks rationing credit. But they also suggest that the extent of credit rationing depends on the strength of existing customer relationships; the size, stability, and prospects for future growth of deposits; and the existence of profitable future lending opportunities.
Importance of lending relationships
That is, loans may be rationed to current and prospective borrowers in accordance with the cohesion of the existing relationships along with expectations about the future profitability of those relationships. In our empirical analysis, we use the notion from Kane and Malkiel (1965) that differences in the relative size of the bank deposit base across markets may provide an indicator of the relative degree of credit rationing in that local market. Petersen and Rajan (1994) extended the theory that relationships are important factors in determining credit rationing. They suggest that the causes of credit rationing, adverse selection and moral hazard, may be more prominent when firms are young or small. However, through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender with sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm's affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of credit. These authors also suggest that an important dimension of a relationship is its duration. Conditional on its positive past experience with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky. This should reduce its expected cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide funds. Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that in addition to interaction over time, relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products. That is, borrowers may obtain more than just loans from a bank. Borrowers may purchase a variety of financial services and also maintain checking and savings accounts with the bank. These added dimensions of a relationship can affect the firm's borrowing cost in two ways.
First they increase the precision of the lender's information about the borrower. For example, the lender can learn about the firm's sales by monitoring the cash flowing through its checking account or by factoring the firm's accounts receivables. Second, the lender can spread any fixed costs of producing information about the firm over multiple products. Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that both effects reduce the lender's costs of providing loans and services, and the former effect increases the availability of funds to the firm. Berger and Udell (1995) also study the importance of relationships in the extension of credit to small firms. They find that small firms with longer banking relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other small firms. These effects appear to be both economically and statistically significant.
According to Berger and Udell, these results suggest that banks accumulate increasing amounts of this private information over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship and use this information to refine their loan contract terms.
Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior. By reducing the expected loss associated with a loan default, the guarantee increases the expected return to the lenderwithout increasing the lending rate. In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of borrowers. † With the guarantee in place, the lender could profitably extend credit at loan rates below what would be dictated by the risk of the average borrower. The reason for this is that the guarantee increases the profitability of the loan by reducing the losses to the bank in those instances when the borrower defaults. To the extent that the loan guarantees reduce the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend, external loan guarantees will help mitigate the moral hazard problem. This is because the lower lending rates afforded by external guarantees reduce the bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the expected return of safe projects vis-à-vis riskier ones. Additionally, lowering the lending rate increases the number of low risk borrowers applying for credit which, in turn, increases the likelihood that the average risk of firms applying for loans is representative of the pool of borrowers. Hence, external loan guarantees also help mitigate the adverse selection problem. Thus, in theory, SBA loan guarantees should reduce the probability that a viable minority-owned small business is credit rationed.
Because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate.
However, the nature of intervention must be carefully evaluated. SBA's guaranteed lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as they serve as a substitute for small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk to the lender of establishing a relationship with informationally opaque small business borrowers. Finally, the SBA loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering the risk to the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment. It is interesting to note that the problem of long-term credit for small businesses was one of the primary reasons stated by Congress for establishing the SBA.
The legislation that created the Small Business Administration was enacted on 
The hypotheses, data, and empirical strategy
One method likely to reduce the costs of asymmetric information based credit rationing is to reduce the amount of asymmetric information in these credit markets
[especially for firms in high-minority areas]. One very practical method for doing this is to encourage lenders to make [profitable] loans that they would not otherwise make.
And, in so doing the lender develops a "relationship" with the borrower. This relationship allows for the collection of borrower-specific information at a relatively low cost through basic monitoring of the loan. This reduces future levels of asymmetric information and reduces credit rationing by fostering a relationship between the highminority area small business and the lending entity.
It also encourages the lender to "learn" more about the high-minority area in general and increases the likelihood of the lending bank making additional loans in that area. This is the [positive] information externality effect discussed in Lang and Nakamura (1993) . SBA guaranteed lending may increase the level of local bank credit available to small firms in high-minority markets by decreasing the amount of firm specific asymmetric information in the local financial market and by increasing the positive information externality associated with learning about the high-minority area.
Our empirical research focuses on SBA guaranteed lending because this is where the empirical evidence is likely to be strongest concerning the impact of government intervention in small firm credit markets. This conclusion is based on two observations. First, SBA guaranteed lending programs encompass all types of small business lenders, from community banks and thrifts to bigger banks. And, second, the SBA guaranteed lending programs are relatively large and have operated for a long time-more than a half a century.
We take as our maintained hypothesis that credit market frictions-primarily in the form of costly information and verification of a small firm's projects-can lead to a socially suboptimal credit allocation that negatively impacts the labor employment rate in the local market. [The implicit assumption here is that labor and capital are complements for small firms.] To the extent that SBA guaranteed lending programs mitigate credit market frictions, there should be a positive relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and the level of employment, especially across less developed [e.g., high-minority] financial markets. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan guarantees lessen credit market frictions by testing whether a measure of the normalized amount of SBA guaranteed lending in a local market is correlated with relatively higher levels of employment in high-minority areas. Our null hypothesis is that there are no discernible differences in the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in highminority markets relative to higher income markets.
Data
To examine this SBA guaranteed lending and employment rates in high-minority areas hypothesis, we utilize data from three sources. Our first source is loan-specific data-including borrower and lender information-on all SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504
loans from 2 January 1991 through 31 December 1999. In 2000 the Census Bureau reclassified their racial categories. Because of this change we do not include data after 1999. A breakdown of loan size, total credit and number of loans reveals that we have over 300,000 loans in our sample. The average size of these loans was about $225,000, suggesting that about $68 billion of credit was extended over our sample period. All of our individual loan data are aggregated to the local market level. For this study, we also aggregate over time to produce cross-sectional observations for our local markets. As in studies by Berger and Hannon (1989) , Calem and Carlino (1991 ), Jackson (1992a , 1992b , Shaffer (1994 , we use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to define the relevant local market for urban areas and non-MSA counties as the local market for rural areas.
Empirical Strategy
To test our null hypothesis we simplify the analysis of Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006) . These authors estimate their models using classic Arellano and Bond panel regression estimation techniques. In this study, we estimate a simple crosssectional OLS fixed effects regression model that incorporates measures of employment levels over our sample period. Our basic model is:
Equation (1) uses the average annual employment rate over our sample period (EMPR) at the local market level to proxy for economic performance. We are interested in how SBA guaranteed lending affects cross-sectional changes in EMPR. The primary variables of interest on the right side of Equation (1) are DEPPOP (the inflation-adjusted deposits per capita in a local market), SBAPOP (the inflation-adjusted total dollar amount of SBAguaranteed loans per capita in the local market) and SBADEP. The variable SBADEP is equal to DEPPOP times SBAPOP. It is a measure of the cross-partial derivative, or interaction term, for the impact on EMPR of higher (or lower) amounts of SBA guaranteed lending at higher (or lower) levels of inflation-adjusted deposits per capita in a local market [DEPPOP] . SBADEP is of interest because it provides an indication of whether SBA guaranteed lending has a different impact in less developed local financial markets. For example, a negative coefficient on SBADEP would imply that the impact of SBAPOP is less at higher levels of DEPPOP. Or, stated differently, SBA guaranteed lending has less impact in more developed local financial markets.
The analysis described above is used to introduce the general relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and local financial market development. Next, we consider the relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and local financial market development in high-minority areas. We use Equation (2) below to conduct this analysis.
Equation (2) is designed to specifically test whether SBA guaranteed lending has a differential impact on local market employment rates in high-minority areas. Two interactive variables are included in Equation (2) 
Notice that we use a measure of total deposits [DEPPOP] instead of a measure of total credit in the local market. We do this for two reasons. First, we cannot construct measures of bank lending at the local market level. Market-level deposit data are available, however, from the SUMD data. And, total deposits should be highly correlated with lending. Additionally, using total local market deposits as an instrument for approximating cross-sectional differences in the level of total market lending is consistent with previous research such as Peterson and Rajan (1995) . Second, King and Levine (1993a) suggest that the local market deposit base is one of several reasonable measures of market liquidity and financial development.
The deposit market Herfindahl index (HERF) is included in Equations (1) and (2) to control for the structure of the local market. Constructed at the market level using branch level deposit data from the SUMD database, HERF provides a measure of concentration, and presumably the competitiveness, of the local banking market. The definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Exhibit 1.
The empirical results
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using a simple OLS fixed effects method.
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression can be found in Our per capita income variable (PICAP) has a mean of $15,562 with a high of $36,772 and a low of $6,637 and a standard deviation of $3,080. Our measure of financial market development, local market deposits per capita (DEPPOP), displays a very wide range also. The high for DEPPOP is $106,313 deposits per capita, while the low is only $147 worth of deposits per capita, and the mean is $8,314 per capita. A similar story can be told for our measure of SBA guaranteed lending activity. Per capita SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP) ranges from a high of $416.39 per capita to a low of $0.00 per capita, with a mean of $28.33 per capita over our sample period.
In table 2 we present a correlation matrix for our main variables. There are several correlation coefficients in table 2 worth mentioning. For example, notice that the local market employment rate (EMPR) is significantly positively correlated with local market per capital income (PICAP), per capita deposits (DEPPOP), and SBA guaranteed lending per capita (SBAPOP). And, that the correlation coefficients for the first two of these relationships are rather large. Also, notice that EMPR is significantly negatively correlated with our high-minority population percentage variable (HIGHM) and HERF.
The correlation coefficients for our independent variables suggest that multicollinearity may be a concern for the relationships between local market per capita income (PICAP) and MSADUM, HERF, and DEPPOP. These and other concerns about multicollinearity are evaluated using a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) method.
In table 3 we present the main results for our study. These results are estimated using an OLS fixed effects method. The fixed effects class variable is the state in which the local market is located. Focusing on individual states as our fixed effect allows us to control for variations in state specific factors associated with systematic influences on employment levels within the same state. Examples of these state specific factors are levels of educational attainment and other human capital measures, technological endowment and advancement, and state level public policies designed to influence employment rates.
From table 3, our measure of financial development (DEPPOP) has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting a positive and significant impact on EMPR. Recall that DEPPOP is per capita bank deposits in the local market. To some extent this is a measure of cross-sectional local market liquidity levels. A similar measure of liquidity was used by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) to proxy for the level of financial development across countries. The issue of endogeneity is a concern for this variable.
For it could be argued that higher levels of employment cause higher levels of per capita bank deposits as forcefully as it can be argued that higher levels of per capita bank deposits cause higher levels of employment. However, as mentioned in our introduction, recent studies such as Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998) , and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) , all report significant evidence supporting the proposition that the causal relationship runs from more financial market development to better economic performance. Furthermore, this issue of endogeneity is not central to our analysis, as we are more concerned with the impact of our interaction variable SBAMIN Notice that SBADEP has a negative and significant coefficient associated with it.
This suggests that at higher levels of financial market development (DEPPOP), per capita SBA guaranteed lending has a lower impact on EMPR than it does at lower levels of financial market development. Given that high-minority areas are likely characterized by relatively lower levels of financial market development, it is possible that SBA guaranteed lending will have more of an impact on local market employment rates in high-minority markets.
This latter proposition is tested directly in Model 3 of times the positive impact in high-minority markets as it does in low minority markets.
Recall that the coefficient on SBAMIN is the marginal impact of SBAPOP in a highminority market, the total impact is represented by the sum of the coefficients [0.018] for SBAMIN and SBAPOP in model 3.
Overall, the results from table 3 suggest that per capita SBA guaranteed lending is significantly positively correlated with the local market employment rate. And, the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on the level of employment is 200 percent greater in high-minority markets relative to low minority markets. These results lead to the rejection of our null hypothesis. Recall that our null hypothesis is that the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in high-minority markets is the same as it is in low minority markets.
Our results are also consistent with the notion that less developed financial markets benefit relatively more from governmental interventions in small firm credit markets. This relatively higher benefit is consistent with a credit rationing argument such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , where the intervention serves to ameliorate a market failure in the small firm credit market. More specifically, the results also suggest that SBA guaranteed lending will have a larger positive impact on social welfare if it is targeted to certain high-minority areas.
Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks were performed for Equations (1) and (2). In particular, we estimated Equations (1) and (2) separately for MSAs and non-MSA counties, using disaggregated guaranteed lending variables for the 7(a) and 504 lending programs. Additionally, we estimated the equations using a stacked regression (OLS) approach with our panel data.
These robustness checks yield results qualitatively consistent with those reported in table 3. Additionally, because of the potential for multicollinearity in our regressors, we conducted a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) analysis. Our VIF results suggest that multicollinearity was not a problem for the results reported in table 3. We also tested the standard errors in our regressions for possible heteroskedasticity. This was not a significant problem.
We recognize that there may some endogeneity concerns with certain variables in our models. For example, higher local market employment rate levels may influence local market per capita income as well as vice versa. We addressed this issue in two ways. First, we removed the per capita income variable from our analysis. This did not materially change our results for our SBA guaranteed lending variable. Second, we used per capita income before the beginning of our sample period (e.g., 1990) in the analysis.
This latter analysis suggested that local markets with higher per capita income at the beginning of the sample period experienced higher levels of employment over the sample period. This provides "some" evidence that higher per capita income levels may result in higher levels of employment. Next, we use the average SBA lending per capita variable for the 1991-1995 period and the employment levels variable from the 1996-2001 period.
All other variables (in model 1 of table 3) were calculated as before. The results from this lagged SBA variable exercise were qualitatively the same as our previous results.
We also used a stacked regression analysis and lagged the SBA lending variable by one period (and two periods). The results were again qualitatively the same.
Conclusions and extensions to our analysis
SBA guaranteed lending programs are one of many government sponsored market interventions aimed at promoting small business. The rationale for these guarantees is often based on the argument that credit market imperfections can result in small enterprises being credit rationed-particularly those in high-minority areas. If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in high-minority markets for small business loans, then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance, and this relationship should be more evident in high-minority markets.
We find evidence consistent with this proposition in this study. In particular, we find a positive and significant impact on the average annual level of employment in a local market as we increase the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. And, the magnitude of this impact is relatively larger in high-minority markets. Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that the impact is three times as large in high-minority markets.
However, all of our results should be interpreted with caution because of at least five issues. First, we are unable to control for small business lending at the local market level and hence, we do not know whether SBA loan guarantees are contributing to economic performance by helping to complete the market or are simply proxying for small business lending in the market. Second, we are not able to test whether SBA loan guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending in a market -a question that is related to who captures the subsidy associated with SBA loan guarantees. 
---
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. EMPR is the average annual employment rate in percentage points over the sample period. HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in market i over the sample period. PICAP is average per capita income in local market i over our sample period. MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if market i is a MSA (metropolitan statistical area). DEPPOP is the average annual per capita bank deposits in market i. SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA guaranteed lending in market i over our sample period. And, SBADEP is an interaction variable equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP. SBAPOP is calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP is calibrated in thousands of dollars per capita. HIGHM is an indicator variable equal to one if the minority population in the local market is greater than 25.55 percent of the total local market population; else HIGHM is equal to zero. 
